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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IMPACT OF REGIONAL DYNAMIC OF VIOLENT EXTRIMISM TO MOSLEM COMMUNITES IN INDONESIA

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Contents

Introduction

Background

Religious radicalism in the form of violence extremism basically does not only oppose the existence of Indonesia modern state and other Asian Countries, but also opposes Human rights and democracy principles. Based on the *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) indicator, a UN initiative, several Southeast Asian Countries such as Philippines and Myanmar, are regarded to be vulnerable to crimes and atrocities, such as the case in Marawi. Meanwhile, the Rohingya citizen experiences genocide done by Myanmar military regime thatincites revenge from the National Rohingya Army (RNA) and Rohingya Arakan Salvation Army.

Restoration of security in Marawi region took more than 5 months with casualties of 165 officers and police, while on the *Maute Terrorist*side, 908 died. More than 10.000 people fled and lived in emergency shelters. The Philippine government, with aid of other countries eventually succeed to reclaim the region occupied by ISIS group.

This Dynamics are the effect of Marawi conflict and the situation faced by Rohingya ethnic. The issue had become consideration for ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia as the largest Moslem countries and Malaysia, as some of the Marawi resistance actor came from these countries. Furthermore, a number of activist from Moslem countries also responded Human Rights violation to the Rohingya Moslems. The Impact of Rohingya case is also felt in Indonesia, in the various expressions of solidarity and empathy from Moslem society in Indonesia.

Problem Formulation and Research Question

The Marawi case shows how religious based radicalism and violent extremism has grown into a political and military force that takes over a region or a city, while the situation faced by Rohingya ethnic brought a sensitive religious issue amidst Buddha religion followers that act violent extremism to the Rohingya Moslem. This later triggers collaboration between ARSA (*Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army*) that further worsen situation. This situation also have potential to involve actors from various states in Southeast Asia, according Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Rohingya case shows how religious based radicalism and extremism with violence can trigger discourse through the narrative of retaliation to Buddha follower in Myanmar and surrounding areas.

One of the main aspect of Marawi and Rohingya case stimulates Jihadist from various states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, etc.

In various scholarly analysis and studies, it is apparent that the network of Jihadist had been formed. Some possible other factor are: (a) The terrorist organization in various organization had become active again; (b) The availability of funds and logistics; (c) Network and Information network between actors; (d) Cross-border actors mobility, including allegation of arms and people smuggling in Philippines.

This research is based on two important questions, namely:

1) How does the Marawi and Rohingya case affects the growth of solidarity of Moslem communities to address the issues?
2) How this condition works as a base for the development of religious violence extremism in Indonesia?

Objectives of the Research

(a) To map, identify, and analyze the narrative structure of appeal, motives, goals and background of the actors involved in the Marawi and Rohingya cases.
(b) To record the impact of Marawi incident and violence faced by Rohingya Ethnic to the Moslem communities in Indonesia.
(c) Capture the lessons learned from the Marawi incident and Rohingya Ethnic cases to construct early warning system and strategy of addressing.

Research Theory framework

Basically there is no single factor that construct RVE, therefore the research focuses on the analysis of narratives that unites the various factor into a multi-dimensional narrative with more influence force. The multi dimensionality covers aspect worth of attention, namely: 1) marginalization narratives (containing the social, economy, political, cultural, and religious dimensions as tying factor); 2) Narratives of appeal (based on the first narrative, then formulated into appeal); 3) Narratives of symbolic violence(is a narrative to build opposition based on identity); 4) Narratives of violence extremism (having dimension of religious based justification). The braid of the narrative structures are the base of the solidarity construction process, imaginable across groups, construct the siblinghood sentiment to fight against causing factors, and attached to the modern state instrument.

Study of this narrative is important, yet often neglected as an early phenomenon. As an example, the Jihadist Combatant groups such as in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, in Schmid (2014) build a mono narrative, that there is an oppression to Moslems. British government in 2004, depicts a simple message from Al Qaeda, that the west wages war against Moslems. Gupta (2005) showed that the narrative needed to be articulated by charismatic individual to succeed. Prominent figures such as Osama Bin Laden, Al Jawahiri, Al Baghdadi had been regarded as charismatic leadership, thus their narratives are regarded as truth. Their narratives has the message the West are against Moslem, and they are behind all the oppression and conflict on all the Moslem lands. As the constructed narratives are about war, then the solution is an armed fight to the west, to defend Islam and cause damage to their oppressor (Schmid, 2014). These narratives are also the base of emergence of Moslem Solidarity, not only nationally but also across the world. This solidarity is constructed as a world view on the principle of siblinghood that they believe as one religious community.

This world view based the narrative primarily related to the ideology developed by Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri and their peers in exile, in Afghanistan,in late 1990s (Gerges, 2009). Their narratives then became global, and knit the solidarity ties to oppose issues regarded of the representation of the West, for example in the case of Bomb Bali, they see tourist from the West, and then they have to oppose these westerners even not in war conditions. In the study of Kruglanski, Chen, and Dechesne et al. (2009) shows that this narrative become the justification to do violence to other people, at the trust the group members.

The research of Briggs and Feve (2013), and Schmid (2014) shows that the thesis about narratives become more important in addressing violent extremism, with big claim of the need to oppose the narratives of Al-Qaeda and similar group. According to them, the narratives here can be understood as a story of verbal expression of the world view of Moslem Group toward the Western world.The narrative then thicken and amalgamated in their minds, and thus incites an opposition in form of war against the West and it's representation that can be state, democracy, and also Western people.

A similar narrative also circulates through social media in Southeast Asia, to attract sympathizer to engage in Jihad on any form. The attack of Jihadist in Marawi led by Hapilon and the siblings of Maute claim the success of taking the city of Marawi. This Information circulates in Social Media to show the *Khilafah* Jihadist in the sub-regions of the countries of Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and probably also the citizens of da China-Uighur, Arab, and Africa (Singh, 2017). The existing network also have potential to revitalize old networks, such as the cells of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) movement. Singh showed that there is anextreme vulnerability in the three borders of South Philippines, East Malaysia and East Indonesia to the military wing of pro-Caliphate in those areas.[1]They had agreed to operate their forces to what the call as *Daullah Katibah* ofNusantara Region (Regional Southeast Asia government).

The pro-Caliphate group has two strategic wings. The first wing is the military wings, or military Jihadist, employing asymmetric war to state and society. This includes the suicide bombers. The second wing is the wing of educational Jihadist, who uses the formal education sector to inject their religion based ideological perspective from pre-school, kindergarten to university level. The idea of war against modern state and democracy does not happen only through military wing. The Supporter of *Khilafah*, as governing institution based on Islamic teaching also spread their ideology through education in central and western Indonesia, with Moslem majority. In this sector the assign teachers who has organic capacity to penetrate deeper in society level. This had become the base to build Islamic government, or *Khilafah Islamiyah* Political system. Through this education Jihad strategy, they were capable to gain support especially from people in urban areas throughout Indonesia. (Mundayat, 2018).

Asef Bayat (2005) asserts that their network strength are based on the imagined solidarity. Further Asef assert that Khilafah Islamiyah actually mimics the modern 20th century European fascist politics in Political Islam. In democracy era, Khilafah Islamiyah had been and would continue to be a problem, as the organization rejects the concept of modern state and democracy. This contradictory dichotomy, then is capable in forming imagined solidarity. According to Bayat:

> "An imagined solidarity is, thus, one which is forget spontaneously among different actors who come to a consensus by imagining, subjectively constructing, common interests and shared values between themselves" (Bayat, 2005).

The spread of solidarity narratives also went together with the narratives of symbolic violence, as an expression of opposition to what they regard as the enemies of Islam. Most people did not realize, that they developed symbolic violence. This occurred as religious values are used to legitimize the justification. Pierre Bourdieu showed assert that Symbolic violence showed more than one form of violence operating together symbolically. Bourdieu explained this as "violence conducted to social agency with their involvement" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002:167). This symbolic force needs dominant and dominated parties to enable operation of violence exchange in daily social relations. Bourdieu (2013) defines symbolic violence as follows:

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1   https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co17120-the-2017-marawi-attacks-implications-for-regional-security/#.XL6UVEtS8_U

"Symbolic violence more or less is the ability to be selfish to ensure that the arbitrariness of the social order is ignored or deemed reasonable, thus justifying the legitimacy of the existing social structure" (Bourdieu, 2013: 16-18).

This study analyzed aspects of narratives, solidarity, and symbolic violence formed through social media, and become religious social activism, expressed through violence, extreme as well as symbolic ones.

Research method

The research uses qualitative and quantitative approach. The qualitative approach is used to understand the solidarity construction process in the participants of extreme violence through narratives to support or be involved in violence in Marawi and forms of solidarity to the sufferings of Rohingya ethnic. This is done through observations on the social environment of extreme violence such as; (i) Environment that enable recruitment and regeneration of Jihadist in Universities; (ii) Narratives and ideologies employed in the recruitment (iii) Organic cells (iv) Worship places as their bases; and (v) Roles of women in organizations. Quantitative approach is used to obtain data from online survey of advices to public, (1) Solidarity (N=126) and assessment of pencil and paper survey; (2) Political Extremism (N=580), using valid and reliable instruments in form of questionnaires. The researchers gathers data from Islamic organization/institutions as follows:

Nama Organisasi/Institusi	Lokasi
Organization/Institution Name	Location
NU; Muhammadiyah; Ex-HTI; FPI, ACT; LazisNU; LazisMU; Dompet Duafa; Dewan Dakwah Islam; Nahdlatul Wathan; Persis; BIN; D88; Ministry of politics and security; Ministry of defense; ASEAN Secretariat; AIPR;PAKAR; IPAC; P2P LIPI; HRW;AMNESTY; GARIS; ACT; MMDC;	Jakarta
FUI	Jakarta/Yogyakarta
Ngruki Boarding School, Members of JI	Solo/Yogyakarta
BNPT	Bogor
RSIS	Singapore
Rohingya Women Development Network; Coalition of Rohingya Organization in Malaysia; United Rohingya Organization for Development; The European Rohingya Council	Malaysia
Burma Human Right Network	London
RSO	Bangkok
Ranau Rescue Team; Sultan Marawi; Marawi citizens; United Youth Group on Peace and Development; Consultant MSU; Pilumbayan Marawi;	Marawi

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Marginalization Narratives and Jihad appeal: Solidarity basis

The existence of Indonesian in Marawi war are related to the Maute. They joined in due the solidarity network with fellow ISIS, being in common ideology. Similarly the Malaysiansjoining the Maute group, came to war in Marawi, as the area is part of the *Daulah Islamiyah* in Southeast Asia and the belief that Maute is strong enough to revitalize the *Daulah* in Southeast Asia.

Maute actually belongs also to the MILF, from the MILF family, his father is in the organic structure of MILF, but the group broke up, as MILF had seen to be collaborative to the government, which in turn disappoints many youngsters. Subsequently the younger generations in the MILF lost their hope of liberation as MILF had been coopted by the government. Thus many youth joined Maute, as a new hope to fulfill the Ideals of the youngsters. This is the narratives being used by the youngsters in the Philippines, which is that they joined Maute, as they see MILF had been willing to speak to the government, then the youngster lost their hopes on MILF.

When the attack to the MILF was launched, there is change of narrative of this group, which is that they launch the attack for the setting up the Khilafah. The change of narrative does not change the support to Maute. They helped Maute as they had become part of communities struggling against the government. Culturally, the Jihad sentiment had been embedded in this particular society as a result of the long struggle of Mindanao people against government, with additional impact of the sentiment of being discriminated. Furthermore, the Narrative conveyed by the Maute is "if you are not with us, then you are part of them, the infidels", made the society choose to join Maute, as they don't want to be regarded as infidels.

This narratives can be used in all places or states in which the government did not use Moslem sharia or law of the God, thus becomes opponent. The narratives gained attention in the Southeast Asia, as they regard that *Thogut* government exist in the entire Southeast Asia with Moslem Majorities. The Marawi incident is also regarded as Jihad project of ISIS to test the scale of jihad army mobilization from neighboring countries in regional area and Asia broadly. Marawi is also the place for them to train on urban warfare, by fighting against Philippines that is regarded as the enemy of Islam. Once succeeded in Marawi combat training, then they are ready to be sent to Syria or other countries targeted by ISIS. As described in the previous part, the process of recruitment for combat Jihad is done through peculiar narrative construction in social media.

The existence of wide range pro-Khilafah group ranging from HTI to ISIS, basically enjoys the benefit of Indonesia democratization, which is a relatively not a repressive one. The Moslems have relatively stable political life, therefore without social conflict or unrest. Most the Moslems are mostly minorities repressed by the state. Thus not surprisingly only small number of people departed to Syria or Marawi to become Jihadists. This means that, even though a number of narrative, yet the appeal to be involved in war in Marawi, are always associated with Syria.

The states with most combatant joining ISIS in Syria and Iraq, in absolute as well as per-capita, tends to be politically repressive states (Arab Saudi, 2500 combatant), politically unstable (Tunis, 6000 combatant), discriminative to Moslem minorities, Russia (2500 combatant) or combinations of all of these. Apart from this, the freedom of expression in Indonesia had created a space, where the radical communities can conduct advocacy for Islamic law and Islamic state without the need of violence to achieve these goals. That renders the number of "fierce" extremist to the level of "manageable".

The narratives used to incite solidarity for Jihad to Marawi, qualitatively is more influential to the group tied to ISIS like the JAT (*Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid*) and JAD (*Jamaah Ansharut Daulah*), and MIT (*Mujahidin* Indonesia Timur/East Indonesia). Meanwhile Moslem communities such as JI (Jamaah Islamiyah), and Neo-JI is very careful in responding the incident in Marawi, and decided to survey first. Based on the survey result they decided not to help the ISIS combatant in Marawi, as basically JI have principal differences with ISIS, except for those who were formerly JI member and later joined ISIS.

On the other hand the appeal for violent extremism to support Rohingya ethnic qualitatively does not have much impact to the Indonesian Moslem community, even have tendency to drive the emergence of humanitarian solidarity, as the government had brought the issue of Rohingya ethnic as Human right violation. Based on this, some Moslem based NGO (Non-Government Organization) in Indonesia sent support to lessen the burden of the Rohingya.

This studies also find quantitatively, that individual that believe in Islam cultural interpretation, tend to be more liberal socially and moderate in the religious political perspective, different with individuals with higher Moslem spirit. Those who belief in literal Islam interpretation have strong tendencies to adopt extreme religious political views, in social as well as religious domains. Factor of narratives circulating in trough the social media have more influence potential the latter group. The finding explain that, the high Islamic spirit has important role in explaining support to extreme political stance, including supporting Jihad related to the narratives circulating in social media.

Multi dimensional factors

Narratives of marginalization

Narratives of Appeal

Reproduction of Symbolic Violence Narrative through Social Media and Education

Marawi

Rohingya Ethnic

ISIS
Isnilon Hapsilon

ARSA (resistance)

Maute/Abu Sayaf

FPI, G212, GAMIS

JAD, JAT, JI,NII/MMI/ Indung-Indung

NGOs, (Humanitarian Aids)

Reproduction of Symbolic Violence Narrative through Social Media and Education

Legend:

→ Violent Extrimism Act

→ Potential to Violent extrimism

→ Humanitarian Aid

Violent Extremism in Marawi an it's impact to the Moslem communities in Indonesia

Radical extremist Islamic group often use propaganda narrative of oppression, injustice and threat to generate solidarity of Moslems. The Narratives is then combined with sacred valued religious texts to justify violence. (Milla, Faturochman, & Ancok, 2013; Milla, Putra & Umam, 2019). Therefore counter narratives to the propaganda of radical extremist group is needed. This is proven to be successful in providing alternative explanation of the prevailing conflict to the terrorism case inmates in Sentul prison (shown in the results of FGD with terrorism inmates in the Sentul prison), thus the narratives are not monopolized by radical groups. Nevertheless,

counter narrative by itself is not sufficient, as there are practical aspects done by groups of violent extremist, symbolic as well as practical. This means that there should be separation from the group. This had proven that in the prison, they have more opportunity to build a wider regional network, as they came from various countries.

Aside from the narrative circulating in the social media,there are other factors grabbing the attention of the people involved in the Marawi conflicts, i.e. drugs, arms trade and competition between groups. Nevertheless, the big narrative circulating is related to religion. The Marawi conflict itself, narratively currently, for the Islamic group in Indonesia is not as popular as the conflict in Palestine and Syria. But, the aggressive propaganda effort from the extremist radical group like ISIS are proved to have only a little impact to a small part of Moslem people in Indonesia, especially only from the proponents of ISIS.

Related to this, there should be anticipation of the movement of this group. Considering the vulnerability of conflict issues involving the Moslems, and the tendencies of strengthening of the Moslem Identity in the Indonesian Moslem, there is high possibility of collective mobilization acts on Indonesian Moslem, not only to conflict areas, but also inspire radical extremist in the country. The Ideologist and religious leader figures also played important roles in the strengthening of solidarity based on religious grouping. In the situation of relatively high Islamic spirit, extreme violence can happen, it's just a matter of time.

Aside of counter narrative, education institution and residence surrounding can be prepared as a buffer for the sprouting of extreme radicalism, through more positive inter group relations, thus can impede the formation of politicized identity. It is also important to observe regional conflict that involve Moslem minorities in Southeast Asian region, namely through the improvement of inter-state cooperation. The Sulu seas and Mindanao islands are areas least observable by the Philippines military, making it difficult to avoid separatism potential, especially with long history of conflict such as what happens in Marawi. It is also important to push more diplomatic effort for peace to Philippine government as part of the ASEAN community. Diplomatic efforts initiated by ASEAN countries can provide important contribution, due to the asymmetric conflict condition between Philippine government and Moslem Minority in Mindanao. There is a need for international bodies cooperation, not only to address conflict area widening, but also attention to Human rights violation that is identified to also happen in the Marawi conflict.

Impact of Marawi Incident	
Moslem Community	**Solidarity form**
JI	Refuse to join after sending investigation to Marawi to decide whether to join or not.
Neo JI	Based in Java, Detach themself from JI, did not send combatant to Marawi, and yet became more militant than the ISIS.
JAD	Joined
JAT	Joined
NU	Refuse solidarity for Jihad. No sympathy to the circulating narratives, Far from daily life of NU followers, Humanitarian aids, Peace efforts
NW	Did not Sympathize, Preserve Indonesian State, Khilafahas daily life, not oriented to a state, Humanitarian Aid, Peace efforts
DDII	Humanitarian Aid, Organization did not warn members involved
JT	Neutral, piggybacked by ISIS of Indonesia through General Santosto enter Marawi
Muhamadiyah	Humanitarian Aid, Peace efforts
Persis	Humanitarian Aid

Legend: JI= *JamaahIslamiyah*, JAD= *JamaahAnsharut Daullah*, JAT = *Jamaah Anhsarut Tauhid*, Neo JI (*Jamaah Islamiyah*New, dissident of JI), NW= *Nahdlatul Wathon*, DDII = Dewan Da'wah Islam Indonesia, Persis = Persatuan Islam, JT = *Jamaah Tablig*.

Violence Extremismto the Rohingya ethnic and its impact to the Moslem community in Indonesia

The problem faced Rohingya had been going for long time, namely at the time the military government build religion based nationalism. The Rohingya ethnic, historically brought in by British colonial government from Bangladesh then driven out of Myanmar and faced discrimination. They then experience violence not only from the military but also from civilian influenced by religion based fascist nationalism. The continuous pressure to the Rohingya ethnic drives social, economy, and humanitarian crises, depriving them from safety feeling, human dignity, and suffering due to continuous Human Rights violation.

The Rohingya ethnic experience then become an international issue as there is a spread of narrative that the Moslem Rohingya ethnic faces human rights violation perpetrated by Myanmar military government with also civilian involvement. The narratives circulates also through social Media Internationally and in Indonesia. This Narratives is then responded by Moslem based violence extremist group, to defend the case through Jihad against oppressive Myanmar Military.

Nevertheless the Indonesian Government then responded through diplomatic avenue, raising concern of the issues faced by Rohingya ethnic as humanitarian problem, that needs the involvement of ASEAN and United Nations as International bodies. This strategy succeeded but needs to be maintained and deepened, as the violence extremist group used the gross human rights violation faced by Rohingya ethnic as narratives to agitate war. Without proper address of this issue, then the imagined solidarity could prevail, about the need to engage in Jihad through war, which subsequently will affect the regional stability and further on triggers home grown terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Humanitarian effort then becomes an important strategy, which then conducted by a number of religious based NGO, by sending humanitarian aid to the Rohingya ethnic. The problem then, in such situation it is difficult to control the flow of logistic, whether it really reach the Rohingya ethnic community in refuge or reaches the violence extreme groups, which had happened in a number of world conflicts such in Syria, Iraq, Moluccas and Borneo.

This Issue needs serious attention from Indonesian government to strategically deepen the humanitarian mission, raising the human rights issue to ASEAN domain. This is important as the

narratives of Rohingya ethnic experience still have the potential to be used in the process of violence extremism ideology.

Impact of violence to the Rohingya ethnic	
Moslem Community/Organization	Solidarity form
NU	Mobilization of fund for refugees
Muhammadiyah	Mobilization of fund for refugees, demand to cancel the Nobel award of Aung San Suu Kyi
PKS	Channeling Donation through DDII , PKPU, and Bangladesh NGO
IHA	Channeling Aids
Dompet Duafa	Channeling donation
FPI	Humanitarian works at Cox's Bazar, Sending members to the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, Call for Jihad,Opening registration for Jihad, but no further report.
HILMI	*Channeling humanitarian fund in Cox's Bazar*
ACT	Aid through Humanitarian Ship
Yogyakarta Salafi Media company	Financial aid to Koran reading teachers
212 Movement	Solidarity Organizing
North Sumatra Moslem Community	Rally to BuddhistMonastery and Chinese communities
Tanjung Balai Moslem Community (GAMIS)	Regard the Buddhist settler as having more economical power
212 Movement	Burning Myanmar Flag
Mer-C and Indonesian Red Cross	Building Hospital

Legend: NW= *Nahdlatul Wathon*, NU= Nadlatul Ulama, FPI=Front Pembela Islam/Moslem Defender front, DDII = Dewan Da'wah Islam Indonesia,PKS= Justice and Welfare Party, HILMI = *Hilal* Merah Indonesia, IHA = *Indonesian Humatiarian Action*, ACT = Aksi Cepat Tanggap, GAMIS = Gerakan Masyarakat Islam/Moslem community movement.

RECOMMENDATION

General Recommendation:

1. Breaking the chain of narratives of "marginalization" and "narratives of jihadist war initiatives" by minimizing multidimensional factors, social economic, and political issues structurally and democratically through a *deliberative* process.

2. Using religious texts to counter narratives of symbolic violence to stop violent extremism, through social media and education to stop their influence.

Recommendations to Respond to Violent Extremism faced by the Rohingya:

Problems faced by the Rohingya ethnicity are issues of gross human rights violation by the state, therefore the handling is:

1. Mainstreaming human rights perspectives at the regional level through diplomacy, *track* 1 to stop violence by Myanmar state security forces and law enforcement.
2. Building diplomatic cooperation, *track* 2 through meetings between NGO's in Southeast Asia, academics, as well as other stakeholders so as not to provoke sectarian issues that encourage religious solidarity, which leads to violent extremism.
3. *Countering* the sectarian narratives, and replace them with human rights narrations.
4. Mainstreaming at the ASEAN level with various *tracks* that enable to ensure the repatriation mechanism must go hand in hand with the elimination of *statelessnes* status of the Rohingya ethnic group. Omission of *statelessnes* status is a violation of international law.
5. In addition, the mainstreaming of justice and welfare solutions for the Rohingya community through stakeholders.
6. Appropriate humanitarian assistance with *stakeholders* to Rohingya refugees that are concentrated in *Cox's Bazar* and its surroundings. There is an urgent and serious need for humanitarian assistance.

Recommendations to Respond to Violent Extremism that occurred in Marawi

The Marawi incident is an investment in the ability of violent extremism groups to wage a city war. Therefore, it requires the following strategies:

1. Civil safety nets at the neighborhood group (RT)/ community group (RW) to be reinstated to counter group propaganda narratives related to Marawi, especially in areas bordering with Malaysia in Kalimantan, and the Philippine border in North Sulawesi.

2. The involvement of moderate Islamic organizations such as NU, Muhamadiyah, and others is important to reduce the emergence of Marawi effect, namely as *home grown terrorism*.

3. Strategies for channeling the violent energy from former terrorist convicts to be involved in programs to prevent violent extremism inclusively with moderate religious organizations, as well as to be agents of peace with their victims to prevent city war scenarios such as in Marawi.

4. Building a network of counter narratives and media literacy with multi *stakeholders* from the grassroots level to broader civil society organizations to counter the call for extremism of religious-based violence, "migrate" through education inclusively, because the Marawi incident initiated the conflict through rooting in the world of education.

5. The Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippine three borders condition has been patrolled by trilateral partnership, but it is still an additional activity, not as a military collaboration under the auspices of ASEAN, to combat the increasing power of ISIS supporters in regional areas. This security collaboration requires trilateral cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippine (Indomalfi), which needs to be deepened more comprehensively and needs to be improved, in order to achieve the joint command of the three countries, to patrol alternatively from each country to lead patrols or security operations.

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